Philosophy Speaker Series: Dr. Julia Nefsky

Dr. Julia Nefsky from the University of Toronto will be the featured guest speaker at the Philosophy Speaker Series on November 21.

In her talk, Imperfect Normativity, Dr. Nefsky argues that philosophers have misunderstood the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, and by examining examples beyond beneficence, they reveal how imperfect duties uniquely allow for moral latitude and play a crucial role in ethical life.

Registration is not required; everyone is welcome to attend.

Abstract

Many philosophers have attempted to draw a distinction between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duties. Roughly, imperfect duties are supposed to be obligations that allow for latitude, or room for choice, in complying with them. Beneficence is typically given as the paradigm example. Suppose, for example, that Mary devotes much time to helping others, including volunteering most evenings at homeless shelters. Given how much she does at other times, it seems fine for her to take this evening off to go to a party. The same is not true of so-called perfect duties. No matter how many times Larry has kept his promises, he would be wronging Jeri if he did not keep his promise to pick her up from the airport just because he feels like going to a party instead. While there seems to be a real distinction here, we (my co-author Sergio Tenenbaum and I) argue that philosophers so far have not understood it. This paper develops a new understanding of the distinction and its wide-ranging significance. In our view, the near-exclusive focus on beneficence as an example of imperfect duties has had an obscuring effect. Through attending to and thinking closely about other examples, we develop a new understanding of the distinctive nature and grounds of imperfect duties, of what differentiates them from perfect duties, and of their crucial practical and moral importance.